Leviathan

Capítulo 1

chapter. So that for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he

hath, in one the Soveraignty by Institution of the people assembled, and

in another by Conquest, that is by the Submission of each particular,

to avoyd death or bonds; to demand of one Nation more than of the other,

from the title of Conquest, as being a Conquered Nation, is an act of

ignorance of the Rights of Soveraignty. For the Soveraign is absolute

over both alike; or else there is no Soveraignty at all; and so every

man may Lawfully protect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword, which

is the condition of war.

Difference Between A Family And A Kingdom

By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of some

Common-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little

Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of

a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants

together: wherein the Father of Master is the Soveraign. But yet a

Family is not properly a Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by

its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without

the hazard of war. For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to

defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of

danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to

the enemy, as hee shall think best; in the same manner as a very small

company of souldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their armes,

and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And

thus much shall suffice; concerning what I find by speculation, and

deduction, of Soveraign Rights, from the nature, need, and designes

of men, in erecting of Commonwealths, and putting themselves under

Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their

protection.

The Right Of Monarchy From Scripture

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To

Moses, the children of Israel say thus. (Exod. 20. 19) "Speak thou to

us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye."

This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the Right of Kings, God

himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith, (1 Sam. 8. 11, 12, &c.) "This

shall be the Right of the King you will have to reigne over you. He

shall take your sons, and set them to drive his Chariots, and to be his

horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and

to make his engines of War, and Instruments of his chariots; and shall

take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers. He

shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give

them to his servants. He shall take the tyth of your corne and wine, and

give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall

take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your

youth, and employ them in his businesse. He shall take the tyth of your

flocks; and you shall be his servants." This is absolute power, and

summed up in the last words, "you shall be his servants." Againe, when

the people heard what power their King was to have, yet they consented

thereto, and say thus, (Verse. 19 &c.) "We will be as all other nations,

and our King shall judge our causes, and goe before us, to conduct our

wars." Here is confirmed the Right that Soveraigns have, both to the

Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is conteined as absolute power,

as one man can possibly transferre to another. Again, the prayer of

King Salomon to God, was this. (1 Kings 3. 9) "Give to thy servant

understanding, to judge thy people, and to discerne between Good and

Evill." It belongeth therefore to the Soveraigne to bee Judge, and

to praescribe the Rules of Discerning Good and Evill; which Rules are

Lawes; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power. Saul sought

the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his

Servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying (1 Sam. 24. 9)

"God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anoynted of

God." For obedience of servants St. Paul saith, (Coll. 3. 20) "Servants

obey your masters in All things," and, (Verse. 22) "Children obey your

Parents in All things." There is simple obedience in those that are

subject to Paternall, or Despoticall Dominion. Again, (Math. 23. 2,3)

"The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chayre and therefore All that

they shall bid you observe, that observe and do." There again is simple

obedience. And St. Paul, (Tit. 3. 2) "Warn them that they subject

themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey

them." This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himselfe

acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by Kings imposed,

where he sayes, "Give to Caesar that which is Caesars;" and payed such

taxes himselfe. And that the Kings word, is sufficient to take any thing

from any subject, when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that

need: For he himselfe, as King of the Jewes, commanded his Disciples to

take the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, (Mat.

21. 2,3) "Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a

shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to me.

And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need

of them: And they will let them go." They will not ask whether his

necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that

necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Gen. 3. 5) "You

shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill." and verse 11. "Who told thee

that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded

thee thou shouldest not eat?" For the Cognisance of Judicature of Good

and Evill, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of

Knowledge, as a triall of Adams obedience; The Divell to enflame the

Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull,

told her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and

Evill. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them

Gods office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new

ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is sayd, that

having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that

place, as if they had formerly blind, as saw not their own skins: the

meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse

(wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being

ashamed, did tacitely censure God himselfe. And thereupon God saith,

"Hast thou eaten, &c." as if he should say, doest thou that owest me

obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is

cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified, that the Commands of

them that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be

censured, nor disputed.

Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths To Be Absolute

So it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and

Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in

Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall

Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make

it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill

consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is

perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The

condition of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but

there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what

proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants,

from which the Common-wealth had its being. And whosoever thinking

Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject

himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where,

and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may

ask them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdome long free from

Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have

been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the

Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an

argument for the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom,

and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths,

and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance

thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should

lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be

inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining

Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and

Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither

poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have

hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.

CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS

Liberty What

Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition;

(by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may

be applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to

Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move,

but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition

of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And

so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained,

with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks,

or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we

use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without

those externall impediments they would. But when the impediment of

motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to

say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth

still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.

What It Is To Be Free

And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the

word, A FREE-MAN, is "he, that in those things, which by his strength

and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will

to." But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but

Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not

subject to Impediment: And therefore, when ’tis said (for example) The

way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk

in it without stop. And when we say a Guift is free, there is not meant

any liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any

law, or Covenant to give it. So when we Speak Freely, it is not the

liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath

obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the

word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or

inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that

he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination

to doe.

Feare And Liberty Consistent

Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into

the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very

willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the

action, of one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for

Feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining,

was the action of a man at Liberty. And generally all actions which men

doe in Common-wealths, for Feare of the law, or actions, which the doers

had Liberty to omit.

Liberty And Necessity Consistent

Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not

only Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel: so likewise

in the Actions which men voluntarily doe; which (because they proceed

from their will) proceed from Liberty; and yet because every act of

mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause,

which causes in a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of

God the first of all causes) proceed from Necessity. So that to him

that could see the connexion of those causes, the Necessity of all

mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore God, that

seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the Liberty of man

in doing what he will, is accompanied with the Necessity of doing that

which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though men may do many things,

which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they

can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods

will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the Necessity of mans

will, and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the Liberty

of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and

Liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of

that naturall Liberty, which only is properly called Liberty.

Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants

But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves

thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so

also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they

themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips

of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power;

and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature

but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not

by the difficulty of breaking them.

Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From Covenants

In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the

Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world,

for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being

a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of

actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what

their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves.

For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that

is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men

to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Againe,

if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd,

for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may

be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they

demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them,

without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to

be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only

in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath

praetermitted; such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise

contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet,

their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves

think fit; & the like.

Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With Unlimited Power Of The Soveraign

Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the

Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For

it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative

can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called

Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the

Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise,

than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe

the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in

Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death, by the command of

the Soveraign Power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: as when Jeptha

caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases,

he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for which he is

neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also

in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For

though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to

Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was not an

Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to doe

what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself; And yet to God, because

David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of

Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact,

evidently confirmed, saying, "To thee only have I sinned." In the same

manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of

their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice;

and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he

would doe: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and

every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written

with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall

accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of

Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a

Jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens

wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to

be Just.

The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty Of Soveraigns; Not Of

Private Men

The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in

the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in

the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all

their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular

men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with

that, which every man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws,

nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as

amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against

his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect

from the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a

full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man: So in States, and

Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not

every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is

to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge)

most conducing to their benefit. But withall, they live in the condition

of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their

frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours

round about. The Athenians, and Romanes, were free; that is, free

Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist

their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie

to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of

the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet

no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie,

or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in

Constantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the

Freedome is still the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name

of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for

their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the

Publique only. And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of

men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if

it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne

parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the

Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and

other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived

those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them

into their books, out of the Practice of their own Common-wealths, which

were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of

the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of

Homer and Virgil.